Ever since the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) issued its August 2015 decision in Browning-Ferris Industries of California, Inc., holding two entities may be joint employers if one exercises either direct or indirect control over the terms and conditions of the other’s employees or reserves the right to do so, the concept of joint employment has generated increased interest from plaintiffs’ attorneys, and increased concern from employers. Questions raised by the New York Court of Appeals in a recent oral argument, however, indicate that employers who engage another company’s workers on an independent contractor basis would be wise to guard against another potential form of liability, for aiding and abetting acts that violate various anti-discrimination statutes, including both the New York State (“NYSHRL”) and New York City Human Rights Laws (“NYCHRL”) and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”).

On March 28, 2017, the New York Court of Appeals heard oral arguments in Griffin v. Sirva, Inc., to answer three questions that had been certified by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit: (1) does the NYSHRL’s prohibition of employment discrimination based on workers’ criminal records limit liability to an aggrieved party’s “employer”; (2) if so, is the scope of the term “employer” limited to a worker’s direct employer, or does it include other entities who exercise a significant level of control over the direct employer’s discrimination policies and practices; and (3) does the portion of the NYSHRL that prohibits aiding and abetting the discriminatory acts of another apply to a non-New York entity that requires its New York agent to discriminate in employment based on a worker’s criminal history.

Griffin illustrates a concern faced by employers in a variety of industries, who subcontract certain types of work to employees of a separate business entity on an independent contractor basis. Among other tasks, companies may engage contractors to provide cleaning services, security, delivery of goods, installation of purchases or, as in Griffin, packing and moving services.  Such subcontracted services may be performed in a variety of settings, ranging from the company’s premises to its customers’ homes.  With increasing concerns regarding workplace violence, companies often choose to conduct their own criminal background checks on these contract workers, either personally or through an outside vendor, in an attempt to protect the company’s employees, customers, and property. This concern is particularly heightened when, as in Griffin, the contract workers in question will be performing services in the homes of a company’s customers.

In these types of scenarios, a question often arises regarding whether the company that engaged the contractors can be liable for violating state or city laws prohibiting discrimination based on criminal convictions, by virtue of requiring the background check, even though that company was not the workers’ direct employer. In resolving this question, courts typically rely on the concept of joint employment, analyzing the extent to which the company is involved in the hiring or firing of the contractors, or in exerting control over their working conditions. Presumably anticipating this sort of analysis, the parties in Griffin (including the State of New York, which filed an amicus curiae brief and was permitted to participate in oral argument) focused their briefing and arguments on whether a company that performs background checks on its contract workers should be deemed an employer under the NYSHRL.  Through its questions at oral argument, however, the court appeared to indicate that there may be a simpler resolution in this type of case, which does not require addressing the complex question of whether the company requiring the background checks is the workers’ employer or joint employer.

In addition to directly prohibiting discrimination based on criminal history, the NYSHRL states that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under [the NYSHRL], or to attempt to do so.” “Person” is defined as including “one or more individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers.” Based on this expansive language, several judges seemed to indicate that the NYSHRL’s “aiding and abetting” provision was sufficiently broad to encompass third parties who conduct background checks on contractors, regardless of whether such entities would otherwise be considered the contract workers’ employer or joint employer.  Assuming the “aiding and abetting” provision covers such conduct, multiple judges noted that imposing liability under that provision would be simpler than wrestling with the joint employment issue.  Further, the judges expressed concern that expanding liability under the main section of the NYSHRL to non-employers would render the “aiding and abetting” provision superfluous.

While it is premature to predict how the Court of Appeals may ultimately rule in Griffin, particularly given the recent unexpected death of one of the court’s seven members, Judge Sheila Abdus-Salaam, companies who engage workers on an independent contractor basis should be aware that potential joint employment issues may not be their only concern with regard to such workers. Regardless of whether a company exerts sufficient control over its contract workers to be deemed a joint employer, if the company operates in a jurisdiction whose anti-discrimination laws allow for “aiding and abetting” liability, that provision may serve as an alternative basis of potential liability for a company that conducts criminal background checks on contract workers engaged through a separate business entity.  Specifically, because the NYSHRL, NYCHRL, and NJLAD each include broad provisions that prohibit any person or entity from aiding, abetting, inciting, compelling, or coercing any acts that violate those laws, businesses that operate in New York State, New York City, or New Jersey should ensure that any background check requirement imposed on another entity’s workers complies with all applicable “ban-the-box” and anti-discrimination laws (e.g., NY State Correction Law Article 23-A, the NYC Fair Chance Act, and the NJ Opportunity to Compete Act), in order to avoid potential liability under the applicable “aiding and abetting” provisions in those jurisdictions.

Our colleagues Brian W. Steinbach and Judah L. Rosenblatt, at Epstein Becker Green, have a post on the Heath Employment and Labor blog that will be of interest to many of our readers in the retail industry: “Mayor Signs District of Columbia Ban on Most Employment Credit Inquiries.”

Following is an excerpt:

On February 15, 2017, Mayor Muriel Bowser signed the “Fair Credit in Employment Amendment Act of 2016” (“Act”) (D.C. Act A21-0673) previously passed by the D.C. Council. The Act amends the Human Rights Act of 1977 to add “credit information” as a trait protected from discrimination and makes it a discriminatory practice for most employers to directly or indirectly require, request, suggest, or cause an employee (prospective or current) to submit credit information, or use, accept, refer to, or inquire into an employee’s credit information. …

Read the full post here.

In January, a New York federal district court denied a retailer’s bid to dismiss a former regional manager’s lawsuit alleging that workplace rumors spread by three female co-workers that she showed her breasts to the company’s CEO by wearing a revealing blouse without a bra and that her subsequent termination shortly after she complained about the gossip constituted hostile work environment sex discrimination and retaliatory discharge. Baez v. Anne Fontaine USA, Inc., No. 14-cv-56621 (KBF), 2017 U.S. LEXIS 1630 (S.D.N.Y. Jan . 5, 2017).

Background

Baez, who normally dressed without a bra, was employed as the East Coast Regional Manager for Anne Fontaine USA, Inc. (“AFUSA”), a clothing retailer that operates 25 stores nationwide.

In September 2013, AFUSA began looking for candidates to replace Baez because of alleged unsatisfactory job performance.  On September 27, 2013, AFUSA extended an offer for Baez’s position to a candidate who declined the job.

In late December 2013, Baez heard that two female managers who reported to Baez and the company’s retail operations manager (also female) were spreading a rumor that Baez had worn a revealing blouse and no bra at a meeting with the CEO, thereby showing him her breasts. On December 27, 2013 Baez reported the rumor to the company’s Controller who, after conferring with the retail operations manager, advised Baez not to write-up one the managers because Baez had already given her a verbal warning and not to terminate the other manager because she was a top performer.

On the 27th, Baez also sent an email to the CEO complaining that one of the managers was telling her team that Baez would soon be terminated. Baez did not, however, mention the rumor about her revealing blouse.

On January 14, 2014 the Controller responded in writing to Baez’s complaint about the rumor advising her “[R]garding the content of the rumor/gossip, you either need to be strong and say ‘so be it, I make my own fashion and life choices…’ Or, if the content bothers you, you need to adjust what you are doing to prevent such rumors/gossip, but you can’t prevent people from having their opinions.” The Controller reiterated that she did not recommend escalating the matter to a written warning.

On January 30, 2014, however, at the direction of the CEO the Controller and Baez met with one of the managers to issue her a written warning. Baez disagreed with the wording of the warning and the manager refused to sign it.

In the meanwhile on January 6, 2014 a week after Baez’s emailed complaints, AFUSA went back to the candidate who had turned them down in September and arranged for her to meet with the CEO. On January 27, 2014 AFUSA offered and the candidate accepted the position of “North America Director,” to start on February 10, 2014.

Thereafter, on February 7, 2014, the CEO and the Controller terminated Baez’s employment. In the termination meeting, which Baez unilaterally taped, the CEO gave Baez three reasons for her discharge: (1) unsatisfactory management of an employee at one of the stores under her supervision; (2) problems associated with the opening of a store; and (3) that she was connected with “too much drama.”  Baez sued AFUSA, the CEO and the Controller alleging violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”) and New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”).

The Court Rulings

The district court found that Baez’s complaint about the gossip regarding her going bra-less and allegedly showing her breasts to the CEO constituted protected conduct and a “very weak claim of discrimination.” The court noted that “if comments on bra-less attendance at a meeting were made by a man, plaintiff’s case would be much stronger[,]” but found “no legal reason why the gender” alters the analysis. The court opined that “even ‘a single comment that objectifies women . . . made in circumstances where that comment would, for example, signal views about the role of women in the workplace [may] be actionable.”

The district court also held that the short time frame between Baez’s December 27, 2013 Complaint and her February 7, 2014 discharge, in part, for being associated with “too much drama” created a sufficient factual dispute to preclude summary judgment on the retaliation claim. The district court acknowledged that AFUSA had articulated two legitimate business reasons for Baez’s discharge, i.e., alleged poor management of an employee and alleged problems with a store opening. Citing Second Circuit precedent, however, the court stated that retaliation need not be the only reason for the adverse job action, but “only that the adverse action would not have occurred in the absence of the retaliatory motive.”

The district court also concluded that there was an issue of material fact over whether the controller adequately investigated the rumor and whether AFUSA responded with the appropriate discipline.  The court granted summary judgement as to the CEO finding no evidence that he directly participated in or abetted any violation of law.

In sum, the content of the gossip, which concerned Baez’s sex; the remedial nature of discrimination statutes and in particular the expansive nature of the NYCHRL; and the use of the word “drama”- a term more likely to be applied to a woman’s behavior – as a reason for Baez’s discharge following her complaints, combined to create enough of a factual dispute to preclude summary judgment.

Lessons For Employers

Retail employers, especially those operating in New York City, should ensure that employees are counseled about the employer’s anti-discrimination and anti-harassment policies, fully investigate all complaints that potentially implicate anti-discrimination laws, and, when appropriate, discipline offending employees.

Retail employers should also ensure that adverse employment actions are based solely upon legitimate non-discriminatory factors which, preferably, are documented. Employers should be careful to avoid ambiguous or potentially charged language, which might undermine the employer’s legitimate reasons for discharge or discipline, when speaking with the employee.

In employment litigation, plaintiffs often rely on the “cat’s paw” doctrine to hold their employers liable for discriminatory or retaliatory animus of a supervisory employee who influenced, but did not make, the ultimate employment decision.  On August 29, 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Vasquez v. Empress Ambulance Service, Inc., greatly extended the reach of the “cat’s paw,” holding that the doctrine could be applied to hold an employer liable for an adverse employment decision that was influenced by the discriminatory or retaliatory animus of a low-level, non-supervisory co-worker.

The plaintiff, an emergency medical technician employed by the defendant, was terminated within hours of complaining to her supervisors that a male co-worker had sent her a text message containing a graphic, sexual photograph.  Plaintiff alleged that when her male co-worker learned that she had complained, he manipulated his iPhone to make it appear that a conversation containing consensual sexual text banter that he had with another person was a conversation between him and plaintiff and, when questioned by the employer about plaintiff’s allegations, provided printed screen shots of portions of this alleged conversation, telling the employer that he and the plaintiff had been involved in a consensual relationship.  In her lawsuit, plaintiff complained that her employer accepted the co-worker’s tale as true, and rejected her offer to turn over her cell phone for inspection or otherwise refute his claim.  Instead, plaintiff asserted that she was told by her employer that it “kn[e]w the truth,” that she had a sexual relationship with the co-worker, and that her employment was being terminated because she had sexually harassed him.   Plaintiff filed suit, asserting that the employer’s decision to terminate her employment was an act of retaliation in violation of Title VII because she had voiced complaints of sexual harassment.  Relying on the “cat’s paw” doctrine, the plaintiff argued that the employer’s decision to terminate her employment was influenced by false information provided by her male co-worker.  The district court dismissed her complaint, concluding that an employer could not be held liable under the “cat’s paw” doctrine for the discriminatory or retaliatory intent of a non-supervisory co-worker.

On appeal, the Second Circuit disagreed and reinstated plaintiff’s Complaint.  Despite the fact that the male co-worker was a low-level employee without any supervisor authority, the Second Circuit held that the employer’s “own negligence provides an independent basis” to treat the male co-worker as its agent and hold it accountable for his illegitimate intent.  Referencing the allegations that the employer “blindly credited” the male co-worker’s assertions and “obstinately refus[ed] to inspect [plaintiff]’s phone or to review any other evidence proffered by [plaintiff] in refutation,”   the Second Circuit concluded that “an employer may be held liable for an employee’s animus under a ‘cat’s paw’ theory, regardless of the employee’s role within the organization, if the employer’s own negligence gives effect to the employee’s animus and causes the victim to suffer an adverse employment action.”

The impact of this decision on retail employers who are often called upon to make employment decisions based on information provided by one employee about another?  Negligence is the key.  Only when the employer effectively adopts the co-worker’s animus by acting negligently with regards to the information provided may the co-worker’s improper motivation be imputed to the employer to support a claim under the cat’s paw doctrine.  Exercise good faith and be thorough in conducting internal investigations.  Do not ignore warning signs.  Consider all evidence offered in making employment decisions.

Our colleague Linda B. Celauro, Senior Counsel at Epstein Becker Green, has a post on the Financial Services Employment Law blog that will be of interest to many of our readers in the retail industry: “Seventh Circuit Panel Finds That Title VII Does Not Cover Sexual Orientation Bias.

Following is an excerpt:

Bound by precedent, on July 28, 2016, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that sexual orientation discrimination is not sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The panel thereby affirmed the decision of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana dismissing the claim of Kimberly Hively, a part-time adjunct professor at Ivy Tech Community College, that she was denied the opportunity for full-time employment on the basis of her sexual orientation.

The importance of the Seventh Circuit panel’s opinion is not in its precise holding but both (i) the in-depth discussion of Seventh Circuit precedence binding it, the decisions of all of the U.S. Courts of Appeals (except the Eleventh Circuit) that have held similarly, and Congress’s repeated rejection of legislation that would have extended Title VII’s protections to sexual orientation, and (ii) the multifaceted bases for its entreaties to the U.S. Supreme Court and the Congress to extend Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination to sexual orientation discrimination.

The Seventh Circuit panel highlighted the following reasons as to why the Supreme Court or Congress must consider extending Title VII’s protections to sexual orientation …

Read the full post here.

The EEOC has released several new guidance tools, for both employers and employees, focused upon religious and national origin discrimination against people who are (or are perceived to be) Muslim. This focus on religious and national origin discrimination is particularly important for retail employers because retailers often require employees to follow dress codes or work at times that may conflict with religious observance.

In December 2015, EEOC Chair Jenny Yang released a statement highlighting the need for employers to “remain vigilant” in light of the recent terrorist attacks. Yang commended employers that have “taken steps to issue or re-issue policies preventing harassment, retaliation, and other forms of discrimination in the workplace.” At the same time this statement was released, the EEOC also released two technical guidance tools regarding religious discrimination: “Questions and Answers for Employers: Responsibilities Concerning the Employment of Individuals Who Are, or Are Perceived to Be, Muslim or Middle Eastern” (“Employer Q&A”) and a similar guide for employees.

The Employer Q&A does the following:

  • provides helpful insight on the various measures that employers should undertake to avoid violations of Title VII, which prohibits discrimination based on religion and national origin, among other protected categories;
  • addresses questions about hiring and other employment decisions, harassment, religious accommodation, and background investigations;
  • reminds employers that they may not discriminate against an individual because the individual’s religious garb may make customers feel uncomfortable; and
  • emphasizes the need to engage in an interactive process with employees who request a religious accommodation, such as time off for religious holidays and exceptions to dress and grooming codes.

When evaluating whether the religious accommodation will cause an undue hardship, the EEOC (through the Employer Q&A) explains that employers may not speculate on whether other employees may seek the same accommodation and make decisions based on those speculations. Rather, each accommodation request must be addressed on a case-by-case basis.

Earlier this year, the EEOC joined forces with other federal agencies, including the Department of Justice, to create an interagency initiative aimed at religious bias. As part of this initiative, in March 2016, the EEOC released another technical guidance tool titled “What You Should Know About Religious and National Origin Discrimination Against Those Who Are, or Are Perceived to Be, Muslim or Middle Eastern” (“What You Should Know Guidance”).

Among other things, the What You Should Know Guidance:

  • summarizes some of the ways in which discrimination against individuals who are (or could be perceived to be) Muslim or Middle Eastern can materialize in the workplace;
  • reminds employers of their obligations to prevent and correct unlawful discrimination or harassment, and provide reasonable religious accommodations;
  • points out several recent cases brought against retailers that involve claims of religious and national origin discrimination and harassment, or a failure to accommodate based on these factors; and
  • highlights the increase in litigation in these areas (in particular, the What You Should Know Guidance reports that, since 9/11, there has been a 250 percent increase in EEOC charges involving religious discrimination against Muslims).

These guidance tools serve as a follow up to the EEOC’s previously released guidance on religious garb and grooming in the workplace, which provides even more detail on how employers should address these issues. Given the EEOC’s increased scrutiny of religious and national origin discrimination against people who are, or are perceived to be, Muslim or Middle Eastern, retailers should be particularly wary of religious or national origin bias. Retailers can work toward preventing this type of bias in the workplace by reviewing and disseminating their anti-discrimination policies and providing training to employees and managers.

A version of this article originally appeared in the Take 5 newsletter Five New Challenges Facing Retail Employers.”

Several states have recently passed laws (California, Maryland,[1] and New York) or have bills currently pending in their state legislatures (California,[2] Colorado, Massachusetts, and New Jersey) [3] seeking to eliminate pay differentials on the basis of sex (and, in some cases, other protected categories) (collectively, “Equal Pay Laws”).

Among other provisions, most of the Equal Pay Laws contain four components. They aim to (i) strengthen current equal pay standards, (ii) create pay transparency rules, (iii) expand equal pay protections beyond gender, and (iv) redefine the geographic reach of existing equal pay laws.

Strengthening of Current Equal Pay Standards

The Equal Pay Laws modify the standards required for plaintiffs to prevail on equal pay claims. Previously, these laws tracked the federal Equal Pay Act, which permits exceptions to equal pay for equal work, “where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex.” The Equal Pay Laws, however, each modify the fourth prong, so that they now permit pay differentials based on a “bona fide factor other than sex” (emphasis added). This additional language allows plaintiffs to bring claims alleging that a neutral factor produced a wage differential that disparately impacts employees based on their sex, and notwithstanding this impact, the employer did not adopt an alternative business practice that would serve the same purpose without resulting in the wage differential. The new standard also broadens a plaintiff’s ability to allege a prima facie case of wage disparity.

Pay Transparency

Many of the Equal Pay Laws include pay transparency provisions, meaning that employers cannot create policies or enforce rules that would restrict an employee’s ability to discuss his or her wages with co-workers. The Massachusetts bill, which is still in the state legislature, has another unique twist (one that actually passed the legislature in California earlier this year but was vetoed by the governor). The Massachusetts equal pay law would prohibit employers from asking about an applicant’s salary history on an application or during interviews for employment. This would mean that an employer could no longer ask applicants how much they earned at their past jobs when considering making an offer of employment to an applicant. This twist aims to ensure that prior pay discrepancies are not compounded when an applicant’s pay rate with a new employer is based on unequal pay rates that the applicant received in the past.

Expanding Beyond Pay Equality Based on Gender

While the Equal Pay Laws were initially intended to ensure that women received equal pay in relation to men, some of the Equal Pay Laws seek to expand equal pay protection to other protected categories. The proposed California law, which is intended to amend the recently amended equal pay law in that state, would expand protections to race- and ethnicity-based pay differentials. Further, Maryland’s recently enacted law requires equal pay based on gender identity.

Geographical Reach

Finally, the Equal Pay Laws differ as to their geographical scope. For example, the New York law limits the reach of pay differentials to “no larger than a county.” In other words, women cannot compare themselves to other employees outside the county where they work. Some of the other Equal Pay Laws have significantly broader reach, such as California, which has no geographic limit. The New Jersey law, which was vetoed on May 2, 2016, but may be reintroduced in the state legislature, would permit wage comparisons based on compensation rates “in all of an employer’s operations or facilities.” This could mean that New Jersey employees could base their equal pay claims on the pay differential between their own compensation and that of employees of the employer in other jurisdictions (even in locations where the standard of living is considerably higher). Unlike New Jersey, the law proposed in Massachusetts would permit employers to base pay differentials on geographic location if one location has a lower cost of living based upon the Consumer Price Index.

Conclusion

As a result of the Equal Pay Laws, employers should consider whether to perform an internal audit (with the assistance of counsel) in order to identify and address any potential pay disparities. Indeed, in light of the recently published regulations on the overtime exemption status of various employees, this summer may be a good time for employers to review their pay practices for all employees.

A version of this article originally appeared in the Take 5 newsletter Five New Challenges Facing Retail Employers.”

[1] Maryland’s equal pay law was signed by Governor Larry Hogan on May 19, 2016, and becomes effective October 1, 2016. New York’s and California’s laws are currently effective.

[2] California has introduced a second equal pay amendment addressing wage disparity based on race and ethnicity. The first equal pay amendment became effective on January 1, 2016.

[3] Louisiana’s equal pay bill was recently rejected in the state House committee, despite passing the Senate and having strong support from Governor John Bel Edwards.

Our colleague Frank C. Morris, Jr., attorney at Epstein Becker Green, has a post on the Financial Services Employment Law blog that will be of interest to many of our readers in the retail industry: “New Online Recruiting Accessibility Tool Could Help Forestall ADA Claims by Applicants With Disabilities.”

Following is an excerpt:

In recent years, employers have increasingly turned to web based recruiting technologies and online applications. For some potential job applicants, including individuals with disabilities, such as those who are blind or have low vision, online technologies for seeking positions can prove problematic. For example, some recruiting technologies and web-based job applications may not work for individuals with disabilities who use screen readers to access information on the web. The U.S. Department of Labor’s Office of Disability Employment Policy (ODEP) recently announced the launch of “TalentWorks.”

Read the full post here.

The New York City’s Human Rights law (“NYCHRL”) prohibits employment discrimination against specified protected classes of employees and applicants including:

Employers Should Care About This: New York City’s Amendment on Caregiver Discrimination race, color, creed, age, national origin, alienage or citizenship status, gender, sexual orientation, disability, marital status, partnership status, any lawful source of income, status as a victim of domestic violence or status as a victim of sex offenses or stalking, whether children are, may be or would be residing with a person or conviction or arrest record.

If this list wasn’t long enough, on May 4, 2016, NYCHRL will add “caregivers” to the protected classes including, anyone who provides ongoing medical  or “daily living” care for a minor, any disabled relative or disabled non-relative who lives in the caregiver’s household.

The law defines “caregiver” as a person who provides direct and ongoing care for a minor child or a person with a disability who: (1) is a covered relative, or a person who resides in the caregiver’s household; and (2) relies on the caregiver for medical care or to meet the needs of daily living.

“Covered relatives” include children (adopted, biological or foster), spouses, domestic partners, parents, siblings, grandchildren, grandparents, children or parents of the caregiver’s spouse or domestic partner, or any individuals in a “familial relationship” with the caregiver.

The NYCHRL prohibits employers from discriminating against caregivers with respect to hiring, compensation, or the terms and conditions of employment. Thus, employers should not ask applicants about their status as a caregiver when making hiring decisions.

Importantly, employers may still (and should!) hold caregiver employees to the same attendance and performance standards as other employees.  Caregivers must still be able to perform the essential functions of their job, notwithstanding their role as a caregiver.

The law does not contain an affirmative requirement to accommodate caregivers, but employers should carefully consider any employee’s requests for time off due to caregiving responsibilities to ensure responses to such requests are being applied consistently and in accordance with any other potentially applicable laws. For example, caregiver employees may be eligible to take sick time under the New York City Earned Sick Time Act to fulfill caregiver duties for medical needs. In addition caregivers caring for medical needs may be entitled to Family and Medical Leave Act benefits.  Employers must also think about how their policies and practices affect caregivers and train managers on the new protections.

The New York Human Rights Commission has not yet issued formal guidance regarding this amendment. Until the Commission does so, the potential reach of the law remains unknown.  But employers should brace themselves for broad interpretations of this law and stay tuned to this blog for updates.

On March 28, 2016, New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio signed three pieces of legislation passed earlier this month by The New York City Council to amend the City’s Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”).

The new laws:

  1. require that the NYCHRL be interpreted expansively to maximize civil rights protections, regardless of how courts have interpreted similar provisions under federal and state anti-discrimination laws;
  2. permit the City’s Commission on Human Rights the authority to award attorney’s fees and costs to complainants in cases brought before the Commission; and
  3. repeal language addressing how to construe the NYCRHL’s prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.

The repealed language provided that the NYCHRL should not be construed to, among other things, restrict an employer’s right to insist that an employee meet bona fide job-related qualifications of employment, or authorize affirmative action on the basis of sexual orientation.

The laws became effective immediately upon the Mayor’s signature. Employers should be aware of the enhanced protections for their New York City employees.