Several states have recently passed laws (California, Maryland,[1] and New York) or have bills currently pending in their state legislatures (California,[2] Colorado, Massachusetts, and New Jersey) [3] seeking to eliminate pay differentials on the basis of sex (and, in some cases, other protected categories) (collectively, “Equal Pay Laws”).

Among other provisions, most of the Equal Pay Laws contain four components. They aim to (i) strengthen current equal pay standards, (ii) create pay transparency rules, (iii) expand equal pay protections beyond gender, and (iv) redefine the geographic reach of existing equal pay laws.

Strengthening of Current Equal Pay Standards

The Equal Pay Laws modify the standards required for plaintiffs to prevail on equal pay claims. Previously, these laws tracked the federal Equal Pay Act, which permits exceptions to equal pay for equal work, “where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex.” The Equal Pay Laws, however, each modify the fourth prong, so that they now permit pay differentials based on a “bona fide factor other than sex” (emphasis added). This additional language allows plaintiffs to bring claims alleging that a neutral factor produced a wage differential that disparately impacts employees based on their sex, and notwithstanding this impact, the employer did not adopt an alternative business practice that would serve the same purpose without resulting in the wage differential. The new standard also broadens a plaintiff’s ability to allege a prima facie case of wage disparity.

Pay Transparency

Many of the Equal Pay Laws include pay transparency provisions, meaning that employers cannot create policies or enforce rules that would restrict an employee’s ability to discuss his or her wages with co-workers. The Massachusetts bill, which is still in the state legislature, has another unique twist (one that actually passed the legislature in California earlier this year but was vetoed by the governor). The Massachusetts equal pay law would prohibit employers from asking about an applicant’s salary history on an application or during interviews for employment. This would mean that an employer could no longer ask applicants how much they earned at their past jobs when considering making an offer of employment to an applicant. This twist aims to ensure that prior pay discrepancies are not compounded when an applicant’s pay rate with a new employer is based on unequal pay rates that the applicant received in the past.

Expanding Beyond Pay Equality Based on Gender

While the Equal Pay Laws were initially intended to ensure that women received equal pay in relation to men, some of the Equal Pay Laws seek to expand equal pay protection to other protected categories. The proposed California law, which is intended to amend the recently amended equal pay law in that state, would expand protections to race- and ethnicity-based pay differentials. Further, Maryland’s recently enacted law requires equal pay based on gender identity.

Geographical Reach

Finally, the Equal Pay Laws differ as to their geographical scope. For example, the New York law limits the reach of pay differentials to “no larger than a county.” In other words, women cannot compare themselves to other employees outside the county where they work. Some of the other Equal Pay Laws have significantly broader reach, such as California, which has no geographic limit. The New Jersey law, which was vetoed on May 2, 2016, but may be reintroduced in the state legislature, would permit wage comparisons based on compensation rates “in all of an employer’s operations or facilities.” This could mean that New Jersey employees could base their equal pay claims on the pay differential between their own compensation and that of employees of the employer in other jurisdictions (even in locations where the standard of living is considerably higher). Unlike New Jersey, the law proposed in Massachusetts would permit employers to base pay differentials on geographic location if one location has a lower cost of living based upon the Consumer Price Index.


As a result of the Equal Pay Laws, employers should consider whether to perform an internal audit (with the assistance of counsel) in order to identify and address any potential pay disparities. Indeed, in light of the recently published regulations on the overtime exemption status of various employees, this summer may be a good time for employers to review their pay practices for all employees.

A version of this article originally appeared in the Take 5 newsletter Five New Challenges Facing Retail Employers.”

[1] Maryland’s equal pay law was signed by Governor Larry Hogan on May 19, 2016, and becomes effective October 1, 2016. New York’s and California’s laws are currently effective.

[2] California has introduced a second equal pay amendment addressing wage disparity based on race and ethnicity. The first equal pay amendment became effective on January 1, 2016.

[3] Louisiana’s equal pay bill was recently rejected in the state House committee, despite passing the Senate and having strong support from Governor John Bel Edwards.

Our colleague Frank C. Morris, Jr., attorney at Epstein Becker Green, has a post on the Financial Services Employment Law blog that will be of interest to many of our readers in the retail industry: “New Online Recruiting Accessibility Tool Could Help Forestall ADA Claims by Applicants With Disabilities.”

Following is an excerpt:

In recent years, employers have increasingly turned to web based recruiting technologies and online applications. For some potential job applicants, including individuals with disabilities, such as those who are blind or have low vision, online technologies for seeking positions can prove problematic. For example, some recruiting technologies and web-based job applications may not work for individuals with disabilities who use screen readers to access information on the web. The U.S. Department of Labor’s Office of Disability Employment Policy (ODEP) recently announced the launch of “TalentWorks.”

Read the full post here.

The New York City’s Human Rights law (“NYCHRL”) prohibits employment discrimination against specified protected classes of employees and applicants including:

Employers Should Care About This: New York City’s Amendment on Caregiver Discrimination race, color, creed, age, national origin, alienage or citizenship status, gender, sexual orientation, disability, marital status, partnership status, any lawful source of income, status as a victim of domestic violence or status as a victim of sex offenses or stalking, whether children are, may be or would be residing with a person or conviction or arrest record.

If this list wasn’t long enough, on May 4, 2016, NYCHRL will add “caregivers” to the protected classes including, anyone who provides ongoing medical  or “daily living” care for a minor, any disabled relative or disabled non-relative who lives in the caregiver’s household.

The law defines “caregiver” as a person who provides direct and ongoing care for a minor child or a person with a disability who: (1) is a covered relative, or a person who resides in the caregiver’s household; and (2) relies on the caregiver for medical care or to meet the needs of daily living.

“Covered relatives” include children (adopted, biological or foster), spouses, domestic partners, parents, siblings, grandchildren, grandparents, children or parents of the caregiver’s spouse or domestic partner, or any individuals in a “familial relationship” with the caregiver.

The NYCHRL prohibits employers from discriminating against caregivers with respect to hiring, compensation, or the terms and conditions of employment. Thus, employers should not ask applicants about their status as a caregiver when making hiring decisions.

Importantly, employers may still (and should!) hold caregiver employees to the same attendance and performance standards as other employees.  Caregivers must still be able to perform the essential functions of their job, notwithstanding their role as a caregiver.

The law does not contain an affirmative requirement to accommodate caregivers, but employers should carefully consider any employee’s requests for time off due to caregiving responsibilities to ensure responses to such requests are being applied consistently and in accordance with any other potentially applicable laws. For example, caregiver employees may be eligible to take sick time under the New York City Earned Sick Time Act to fulfill caregiver duties for medical needs. In addition caregivers caring for medical needs may be entitled to Family and Medical Leave Act benefits.  Employers must also think about how their policies and practices affect caregivers and train managers on the new protections.

The New York Human Rights Commission has not yet issued formal guidance regarding this amendment. Until the Commission does so, the potential reach of the law remains unknown.  But employers should brace themselves for broad interpretations of this law and stay tuned to this blog for updates.

On March 28, 2016, New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio signed three pieces of legislation passed earlier this month by The New York City Council to amend the City’s Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”).

The new laws:

  1. require that the NYCHRL be interpreted expansively to maximize civil rights protections, regardless of how courts have interpreted similar provisions under federal and state anti-discrimination laws;
  2. permit the City’s Commission on Human Rights the authority to award attorney’s fees and costs to complainants in cases brought before the Commission; and
  3. repeal language addressing how to construe the NYCRHL’s prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.

The repealed language provided that the NYCHRL should not be construed to, among other things, restrict an employer’s right to insist that an employee meet bona fide job-related qualifications of employment, or authorize affirmative action on the basis of sexual orientation.

The laws became effective immediately upon the Mayor’s signature. Employers should be aware of the enhanced protections for their New York City employees.

Nancy L. Gunzenhauser
Nancy L. Gunzenhauser

One of the requirements of the amended Philadelphia ban-the-box law has gone into effect. As of March 14, 2016, Philadelphia employers are required to post a new poster provided by the Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations in a conspicuous place on both the employer’s website and on premises, where applicants and employees will be most likely to notice and read it.

The amended law strengthens the prohibition on requesting criminal conviction information prior to a conditional offer of employment. Employers in Philadelphia may no longer use a multijurisdictional application with a criminal conviction question, even where the application advises Philadelphia applicants to not answer the criminal conviction question.  Further, employers are subject to new requirements upon rescinding an offer for employment.

Philadelphia employers should conspicuously post the new poster, remove the criminal conviction question on any job applications, and follow all procedures for rescinding an offer of employment.

Laura C. Monaco
Laura C. Monaco

This week, the EEOC filed its first two federal lawsuits that frame allegations of sexual orientation-based harassment and discrimination as claims of unlawful “sex discrimination” under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

In EEOC v. Pallet Companies the EEOC alleges that an employee’s night-shift manager harassed her because of her sexual orientation by making repeated offensive comments (sometimes accompanied by sexually suggestive gestures), such as “I want to turn you back into a woman” and “I want you to like men again.”  According to the Complaint, the employee was discharged after she complained about her manager’s comments to another supervisor and the Human Resources department.  The EEOC makes similar allegations in EEOC v. Scott Medical Health Center.  There, a supervisor allegedly harassed an employee by making repeated anti-gay comments and vulgar statements about the employee’s sexual orientation.  The employee claims that he was constructively discharged after the company refused to take any corrective action in response to his complaints.

In both lawsuits, the EEOC articulates three legal theories in support of its claim that the alleged sexual orientation harassment constitutes unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII.  First, sexual orientation discrimination “necessarily entails” treating an employee less favorably due to his or her sex and, therefore, the employee’s gender unlawfully motivated the alleged harassment.  Second, the alleged harassment stemmed from the employee’s failure to conform to the harasser’s “sex stereotypes and norms.”  Third, the harasser displayed both general objections to the idea of individuals having romantic associations with others of the same sex, as well as a specific objection to the employee’s close, loving association with a same-sex partner.

Although these are the first lawsuits the EEOC has filed on the grounds of sexual orientation discrimination as “sex discrimination” under Title VII, the agency has actually raised these same three legal theories before.  In July 2015, the EEOC issued Baldwin v. Department of Transportation, an agency determination concluding that allegations of sexual orientation discrimination necessarily state a claim of unlawful sex discrimination because (1) the alleged discrimination would not have occurred but for the employee’s sex, (2) the challenged treatment was based on the sex of the people the employee associates with, and/or (3) the alleged conduct was premised on the fundamental “sex stereotype, norm, or expectation that individuals should be attracted only to those of the opposite sex.”

The EEOC’s new lawsuits attacking sexual orientation discrimination represent just one facet of the agency’s recent efforts to address emerging and developing issues – one of the six national priorities identified in its Strategic Enforcement Plan for fiscal years 2013 to 2016.  In addition to focusing on sexual orientation discrimination, the EEOC also recently filed federal lawsuits alleging unlawful sex discrimination against transgender individuals.  As the EEOC intensifies this focus, employers should review their antidiscrimination policies to determine whether LGBT employees have the same protections as employees in other protected categories, and should consider expanding their training programs to ensure they encompass issues relating to sexual orientation, gender identity, and transgender discrimination.  Employers should also remain mindful of state and local legislation that has increasingly expanded to prohibit sexual orientation or gender identity discrimination in employment.

Joshua A. Stein
Joshua A. Stein

For businesses hoping to identify an avenue to quickly and definitively defeat the recent deluge of website accessibility claims brought by industrious plaintiff’s firms, advocacy groups, and government regulators in the initial stages of litigation, recent news out of the District of Massachusetts – rejecting technical/jurisdictional arguments raised by Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology – provides the latest roadblock.

In National Association of the Deaf, et al., v. Harvard University, et al. (Case No. 3:15-cv-30023-MGM, Dist. Mass.) and National Association of the Deaf, et al., v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Case No. 3:15-cv-30024-MGM, Dist. Mass.), Plaintiffs brought claims on behalf of individuals who are deaf or hard-of-hearing, alleging that Harvard and MIT violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act by failing to offer its online video content in a format accessible to individuals who are deaf or hard-of-hearing (e.g., by providing captioning).  Facing case law in the District of Massachusetts that already made arguing against the potential applicability of Title III to goods and services offered on websites more difficult (see Nat’l Assoc. of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc. (D. Mass. June 19, 2012)), both Harvard and MIT made motions to dismiss and/or stay the actions pending the U.S. Department of Justice’s eventual promulgation of website accessibility regulations governing places of public accommodation under Title III (currently expected in 2018) by asserting the primary jurisdiction doctrine.  DOJ submitted Statements of Interest in both cases opposing Harvard and MIT’s motions, arguing that the courts are presently capable of adjudicating Plaintiffs’ claims based on the existing state of the law and any delay pending the release of its regulations would unduly prejudice the Plaintiffs.

While it will not become a final order until adopted by U.S. District Court Judge Mastrioanni, in an extensive and thorough decision, Magistrate Judge Robertson, denied both Harvard and MIT’s motions in their entirety.  The decisions hold, among other things, that these were not appropriate matters to invoke the primary jurisdiction doctrine because the existing law provides the necessary legal framework for the Court to appropriately adjudicate whether or not Section 504 and Title III were violated by Harvard and MIT’s failure to provide captioning of its online video content.  The Court explained that it did not need to await DOJ’s issuance of final regulations because, if necessary, it had other resources available through which to educate itself about any technical issues involved in the case.  Moreover, as the analysis involved in accessibility cases must be specifically tailored to the entity and situation in question, the Court was not concerned about the potential impact these decisions might have on any broader issues addressed by DOJ’s regulations.  Finally, noting that DOJ’s Title III regulations will not even be in final form if delivered as planned in 2018, the Court expressed concern about the amount of time that would elapse for Plaintiffs if it was concluded that the defendants were violating the law.  This decision comes on the heels of the U.S. District Court of the Western District of Pennsylvania’s decision this past November denying a similar motion to dismiss made by Huntington National Bank in defending against a claim brought by the law firm Carlson Lynch Sweet & Kilpea on behalf of Michelle Sipe.  (Sipe v. Huntington National Bank, Case No. 2:15-cv-01083-AJS (W.D.Pa. 2015))  While that decision came without any discussion, the papers filed by both parties relied heavily upon those submitted by the parties in the Harvard and MIT decisions.

These recent decisions reveal a reluctance among the courts to dismiss website accessibility actions on technical/jurisdictional grounds.  Taken along with the expanding number of jurisdictions who subscribe to legal theories accepting that Title III covers website accessibility (whether adopting a nexus theory or broadly interpreting the spirit and purpose of the ADA) and it is becoming increasingly clear that many businesses will have a difficult time ridding themselves of website accessibility claims in the early stages of litigation.  Of course, these decisions have been quick to note they do not foreclose a variety of potentially successful defenses that may be asserted later in the litigation – e.g., undue burden, fundamental alteration, and the provision of equivalent/alternative means of access.  While, to date, the existing website accessibility case law has not focused on when these defenses might prevail, with the recent proliferation of website accessibility demand letters and litigation, businesses should soon find themselves with greater guidance from the courts.  In the interim, the best way to guard against potential website accessibility claims continues to be to take prophylactic measures to address compliance before you receive a demand letter, complaint, or notice of investigation.

We will, of course, continue to monitor these ongoing developments and update you as appropriate.


In the wake of several high-profile wins for the LGBT community, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) added employment discrimination protection to the list.  On July 16, 2015, the EEOC ruled that discrimination against employees based on sexual orientation is prohibited by Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) as discrimination based on sex.

The EEOC held that “[s]exual orientation discrimination is sex discrimination because it necessarily entails treating an employee less favorably because of the employee’s sex.”  The EEOC noted that sex-based considerations also encompassed gender-based considerations under Title VII. This ruling, if accepted by federal courts, would extend protection under Title VII to decisions made on the basis of sexual orientation. While only the Supreme Court can issue a final, definitive ruling on the interpretation of Title VII, EEOC decisions are given significant deference by federal courts.

Employers across the U.S. should anticipate that overt actions, practices, and harassment that could be construed as discriminatory on the basis of a worker’s sexual orientation will be challenged in federal court and subject employers to potential liability.

By Nancy L. Gunzenhauser 

As we’ve previously advised, make sure you are prepared for interns this summer! This summer there’s a new legal trend about interns. While wage and hour lawsuits are still hot, the new “it” trend seems to be laws that extend protection against discrimination and harassment for interns.  Recently, states and cities have been adding interns to the protected individuals under their human rights laws.

Retailers have long used interns, both to provide training opportunities for the interns and to supplement their workforce over the summer months. Whether an intern should be paid or unpaid (meeting the test of a “trainee”) is a determination that should be made using the federal six-factor test, and any applicable state tests. 

Regardless if the intern is paid or unpaid, certain policies and procedures need to be tailored to interns, and should differ from those given to regular employees. While recruitment efforts and offer letters need to be prepared just for interns, certain benefits and policies may need to be provided to all workers – even unpaid interns.

This year, New York City joined Washington, D.C. and the state of Oregon in passing a law protecting interns from sexual harassment, and other forms of employment discrimination. Now, several other states are seeking to expand those same protections to interns. In the past month, legislatures in California, New York, and Illinois have debated and voted on these bills.

The decision to give interns the same protections against discrimination and harassment as employees could affect how interns are treated under wage and hour laws. While the NYC law states that it applies to both paid and unpaid interns, it doesn’t make any determination as to whether those interns should be classified as employees, to receive minimum wage and potentially overtime.

The proposed New York state legislation addresses such concerns that some employers may have over the decision to extend anti-discrimination protections to interns. The current text of the bill, which has advanced to the third reading within the state Senate, provides that “nothing in this section shall create an employment relationship between an employer and an intern.”

A similar law is pending in Illinois, but it has been amended to only protect unpaid interns who meet a certain set of factors, which are similar to the federal six-factor test:

the person works for the employer at least 10 hours per week; the employer is not committed to hiring the person at the conclusion of his or her tenure; the employer and the person agree that the person is not entitled to wages for the work performed; and the work provides experience for the benefit of the person, does not displace regular employees, and is performed under the close supervision of staff.

The wording of the Illinois bill shows that legislators are aware that granting unpaid interns, who may not qualify as employees under the law, rights typically only afforded to employees could affect their employment status.

As more states continue to address whether interns, paid or unpaid, will be protected under anti-discrimination laws, stay tuned to the Retail Labor and Employment Law blog for any updates. If you’re having interns this summer in NYC, DC or Oregon, make sure policies and procedures are updated and are distributed to all employees and non-employee interns!

By Marisa S. Ratinoff and Amy Messigian

In a matter of first impression, the California Court of Appeal held last month that an employee who exhausts all permissible leave under the Pregnancy Disability Leave (“PDL”) provisions of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) and is terminated by her employer may nevertheless state a cause of action for discrimination.

In Sanchez v. Swissport, Inc., the plaintiff, a former employee of Swissport, alleged that she was diagnosed with a high risk pregnancy requiring bed rest in February 2009 and was due to give birth in October 2009. The plaintiff alleges that she made Swissport aware of her condition and need to remain on bed rest until after the birth of her child. However, with three months remaining in her pregnancy, the plaintiff was terminated by Swissport in July 2009 after exhausting her 4-month PDL entitlement as well as her accrued vacation. The plaintiff alleges that she would have been able to return to work shortly after October 2009 and that her employer never engaged in the interactive process in order to identify available accommodations, such as the extended leave of absence she had requested.

At the trial court level, Swissport challenged the lawsuit on the grounds that the plaintiff had exhausted her PDL entitlement and that no further leave was required. The trial court agreed and the plaintiff appealed. Reversing the decision, the Court of Appeal stated that an employee’s entitlements under PDL are supplemental to the general non-discrimination provisions of FEHA.

While an employer must provide 4 months of PDL to an employee disabled by pregnancy without regard to the hardship to the employer, its duty continues after PDL has been exhausted to engage in the interactive process with the employee to determine whether it may accommodate the disability. Continuing the leave of absence may be a possible accommodation if it will not be an undue hardship to the employer.

This case presents a cautionary tale to employers who base termination decisions simply on the exhaustion of a guaranteed leave entitlement under state or federal law. In all cases, where an employee exhausts their guaranteed leave entitlement but seeks to continue his or her leave of absence due to disability, employers should consider whether an extended leave of absence may be accommodated. If it will be difficult to accommodate an extended absence in the employee’s current position, an employer may also consider transferring the employee to a comparable vacant position and continuing his or her leave of absence from that position. Discussing available options with counsel is highly recommended.